# 隐私计算与数据合规(2024-2025)期末

## A 卷

<u> </u> .	单冼颖	(下列选项中仅有一/	个冼顼县正确的)
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- 1. If  $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ , and  $c \in \mathbb{Z}$ , then
  - (A)  $ac \equiv bc \pmod{n}$
  - (B) a = b
  - (C)  $ac \neq bc \pmod{n}$
  - (D)  $a \neq b$
- 2. El-Gamal encryption is IND-CPA (indistinguishable chosen plaintext attack) secure under which assumption
  - (A) Discrete logarithm
  - (B) Factoring
  - (C) Computational Diffie-Hellman
  - (D) Decisional Diffie-Hellman
- 3. Which of the following techniques is NOT a trusted hardware?
  - (A) Zero-knowledge proof
  - (B) Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
  - (C) ARM TrustZone
  - (D) Intel SGX
- 4. Which of the following protocols is to privately compute the intersection of two sets:
  - (A) PSI
  - (B) PIR
  - (C) Encrypted database
  - (D) Federated learning

#### 二、不定项选择题(下列选项中至少有一个选项是正确的,少选或多选均不得分)

- 1. Choose all correct descriptions for Zero-knowledge proofs from the followings.
  - (A) Zero-knowledge proofs have interactive and non-interactive two types.
  - (B) All zero-knowledge proofs must repeat multiple times to have high enough soundness.
  - (C) Zero-knowledge proofs do not leak any information to the verifier.
  - (D) The security of zero-knowledge proofs can be guaranteed against computationally unbounded adversaries.
- 2. Lifted El-Gamal encryption is a modification of El-Gamal encryption; namely, encrypting of "instead of m. Choose all correct descriptions.
  - (A) Lifted El-Gamal encryption is additively homomorphic.
  - (B) The security assumption of lifted El-Gamal encryption is the same as El-Gamal encryption.
  - (C) Lifted El-Gamal cannot be used to encryption large plaintext; otherwise, the description may fail.
  - (D) The security of lifted El-Gamal can be reduced to the discrete logarithm assumption.
- 3. Choose the building blocks for secure two/multi party computation:
  - (A) OT
  - (B) Garbled Circuit
  - (C) Secret Sharing
  - (D) Private set intersection
- 4. Choose all correct descriptions for universal composability security framework from the followings:
  - (A) Protocols with universal composability is information theoretical secure.
  - (B) Protocols with universal composability can be executed concurrently.
  - (C) Universal composability is a framework for proving protocol security.
  - (D) Universal composability is a simulation-based security definition.

#### 三、问答题

- 1. Alice holds input  $A = (a_1, a_2, ..., a_n)$ , Bob holds input  $B = (b_1, b_2, ..., b_n)$ . Design a two-party protocol that allows Alice and Bob to jointly compute the inner product of A and B (i.e.,  $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i * b_i$ ) without leaking their input to each other.
- 2. What is the security definition of the oblivious transfer protocol? Given a secure (1,2)-OT, (i.e. 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol,) could you construct a (1,4)-OT protocol? And show why the proposed a (1,4)-OT protocol is secure.

3. Explain why the following protocol is insecure:

Alice has a set  $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_i)$  and Bob has a set  $(y_1, y_2, ..., y_i)$ . To compute intersection, Alice sends  $(H(x_1), H(x_2), ..., H(x_i))$  to Bob, where  $H(x_1)$  is a cryptographic hash function. Bob computes the intersection between  $(H(y_1), H(y_2), ..., H(y_i))$  and  $(H(x_1), H(x_2), ..., H(x_i))$ .

4. Describe the SPDZ protocol for  $P_1, \ldots, P_n$  to jointly evaluate the function  $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ , where  $x_i$  is the private input of  $P_i$ .

### 分数:

• 单选题: 4+4=16

多选题: 6+4=24

• 问答题: 15 + 4 = 60